Germ-line Interventions in the International Regime of Human Rights and Human Dignity by Haberland, Bastian B.
  
1
Bastian B. Haberland
GERM-LINE INTERVENTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
  
2
Bastian B. Haberland1
GERM-LINE INTERVENTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
ABSTRACT: Germ-line interventions allow parents to take influence on their child’s genetic 
disposition and give scientists the means to eradicate hereditary diseases. At the same time, nothing is 
more controversial in the realm of genetics than the child as an object of parental gustoes - the 
“designed child”. This article begins with an overview of the international regulations dealing with 
germ-line interventions. It then turns to the question whether there are international human rights that 
promote a permissive policy towards germ-line interventions, such as the right to health, as opposed 
to those international rules that seem to restrict the application of germ-line interventions, such as 
human dignity. The analysis results in the conclusion that the prohibition of germ-line interventions 
for non-therapeutic purposes is an evolving rule of customary international law. In order to give this 
rule a more tangible outline, the appendix contains the draft of a “Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Non-Therapeutic Germ-line Interventions”.
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I. INTRODUCTION
‘I not only think that we will tamper with Mother Nature, I think Mother wants us to.’ Writer 
and director Andrew Niccol chose this statement by Professor Willard Gaylin of Columbia 
University for the opening sequence of his 1997 motion picture Gattaca. Based on Robert 
Heinlein’s 1942 novel Beyond This Horizon, Niccol’s film pictures a society in which 
humanity has optimised the utilisation of its genetic potential and nearly eradicated physical 
and mental dysfunctions. Genetic determinism has marginalized individuals without genetic 
enhancement and has created a meritocracy based entirely on a person’s genetic disposition. 
Heinlein’s dystopia is written in the tradition of Aldous Huxley’s 1932 narrative Brave New 
World, in which a carefree, healthy and technologically advanced humanity lives in a strict 
system of social stratification. Both scenarios correspond to the common fear that humankind 
will have to buy the prospect of a higher standard of living through genetic engineering in 
exchange for the abandonment of social diversity and individual liberties. In contrast to this 
dystopian view, the ability to improve the quality of life, to increase the standard of health and 
to bring out the best in the human race seems an almost insurmountable temptation.  The 
excitement about genetics, however, is habitually dampened by the unpredictability of the 
social and biological long-term consequences of an artificially altered human gene pool. 
Although global effects on the human species will not be detectable until the next millennium 
the gene pool might experience irreversible and incalculable alterations within only one 
generation. Then again, the genetically improved human might as well be a type of 
evolutionary selection that is necessary in the next stage of humankind.2 Natural alterations of 
the gene pool would compete with human interventions that critics label “unnatural”. 
However, the unpredictable evolutionary process of natural selection will still determine 
human survivability. Evolution is neutral and “minds” neither if we opt for genetic 
engineering nor if the human species becomes extinct like so many species before.
However, not all methods of genetic engineering have the same profound effects. 
Somatic cell interventions, for example, aim at curing or preventing genetic diseases but 
affect the individual organism only. Indirect germ-line interventions make use of genetic 
information and take influence on reproductive decisions. A well-known example is the 
rejection of embryos or the decision not to procreate at all if the genetic dispositions in the 
                                                
2 Daniel E. Koshland Jr., ‘The Future of Biological Research: What is Possible and What is Ethical?’ (1988-89) 
3(2) MBL Science 11, 12.
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parental genes predict severe complications.3 In contrast to those methods, direct germ-line 
interventions result in an inheritable change of an individual’s genetic material by inserting 
desirable genes or deactivating undesirable genes in germ-line cells.4 The specific feature of 
transferring genetic alterations to possible offspring makes the method both interesting and 
risky. It is interesting because it can prevent inherited diseases and patch genetic defects. It is 
risky because the biological consequences are uncertain and parents and social influences 
could impose their gustoes on the unborn child. 
The social implications of germ-line interventions are obvious. Moral, ethical and 
biological uneasiness is prone to be sidelined by the temptation of a better, a close-to-perfect 
life and the elusiveness of the supposed risks for future generations. Some techniques may be 
desired by the majority of individuals but at the same time cause wider public concern. An 
often-cited example is the “designed child” and its potential to aggravate discriminatory 
behaviour against people who do not meet the socially determined genetic standard. To an 
unprecedented degree, individual choices would have serious impact on humanity’s self-
conception and biological design. While hitherto scientific interventions mostly affected 
individuals as subjects, genetic engineering could make individuals objects of a higher cause. 
This “higher cause”, however, is very susceptible to abusive interpretations and seems 
impossible to determine universally since ethical boundaries vary between individuals, 
families, nations and cultures. For this reason, a global response to germ-line interventions 
would have to overcome a lot of social as well as legal difficulties and ambiguities. A 
genetically improved genetic human standard, for example, would challenge the various non-
discrimination clauses throughout the body of human rights law.5 Moreover, States might 
have to restrict access to genetic engineering to prevent individuals and private biotechnology 
firms from jeopardising the genetic diversity of humankind. They would be advocates for 
genetic diversity and for the inviolability of the gene pool of future generations. As advocates, 
they could underpin their argument by referring to the right of future generations to be free of 
genetic alterations made without their consent,6 a child’s right to an untouched genetic 
                                                
3 Alan Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, From Chance to Choice – Genetics and 
Justice (2000) 6-7.
4 Desmond S.T. Nicholl, An Introduction to Genetic Engineering (2nd ed, 2002) 210-1.
5 Iulia-Antoanella Motoc, Specific Human Rights Issues: Human Rights and Bioethics, United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, 55th sess, [39-44], UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/36 (2003).
6 Margaret Somerville, ‘Introduction to Section V(d): Reproduction, Technologies and Human Rights‘ in 
Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global Challenge
(1993) 873.
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inheritance7 or the collective human right to live in a genetically diverse world.8 In order to 
protect the human genome States could also bring up the Common Heritage of Humankind 
principle.9 Conversely, individuals could claim that it is there legitimate right to interfere with 
their genome as they please. They could rely on the States’ human rights obligations that seek 
to limit the interference with an individual’s personal and corporal integrity and guarantee 
access to social and economic resources.10 Indeed, individuals could raise some human rights 
whose language seem to support the development and use of germ-line interventions11 such as 
the freedom of reproduction, the protection of the family, the rights of the child and the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health. Then again, all those rights contained in binding 
and non-binding norms and declarations cover genomics very generally (if at all) and the 
derivation of genetic rights could go beyond their traditional interpretations.12 Even though 
radical interpretations seem possible, are they advisable? Individual freedoms always need to 
be linked with their societal impacts, which is especially relevant in the realm of genetics 
where the exercise of far-reaching genetic rights might have detrimental effects on humankind 
as a whole. To avoid such developments, States could be entitled to limit those rights and 
secure ‘due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.’13
This short overview on the controversies concerning germ-line interventions also 
serves as an outline for this article. The juxtaposition of the pros and cons of germ-line 
interventions and the Janus-faced nature of most arguments will serve as another leitmotiv. In 
chapter III, I will go further into the question of whether there are rights that favour germ-line 
interventions. I will answer this question in the affirmative only for the right to benefit from 
scientific progress and the freedom of research. Every other right that could be invoked has 
not yet reached a level of recognition where they would contain a “right to germ-line 
interventions”. The most important factor in this context is that the general concept of “rights 
of future generations” has not yet gained a foothold in international law. After this first part of 
                                                
7 W. French Anderson,‘Human Gene Therapy’ in Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters (eds) Contemporary 
Issues in Bioethics (4th ed, 1994) 665.
8 Maha F. Munayyer, ‘Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a New Language for 
International Human Rights’ (1997) 12 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 687, 717.
9 J.M. Spectar, ‘The Fruit of the Human Genome Tree: Cautionary Tales About Technology, Investment, and the 
Heritage of Humankind’ (2001) 23 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 1; Melissa 
L. Sturges, ‘Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage 
of Humankind’ (1997) 13 American University International Law Review 219.
10 Alastair T. Iles, ‘The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights Framework’ (1996) 9 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 27, 28.
11 Stephen P. Marks, ‘Tying Prometheus Down: The International Law of Human Genetic Manipulation’ (2002) 
3 Chicago Journal of International Law 115, 122; see especially Munayyer, above n 8, 701.
12 Iles, above n 10, 36.
13 See e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or International Bill of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III), 
UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/217(III) art 29(2) (1948) (‘Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’).
  
6
the analysis, I will elaborate whether the right to benefit from scientific progress and the 
freedom of research are limited by other rights that restrict interventions into the human germ-
line. I will show that, despite its frequent appearance in the discussion on genetics, the 
concept of human dignity does not necessarily exclude germ-line interventions. Besides that, 
all other supposedly restrictive rights suffer from the same lack of recognition of the concept 
of rights of future generations as their permissive counterparts. Nevertheless, my study will 
reveal that there is unanimous international opposition to interventions for non-therapeutic 
purposes, which has the potential to develop into a rule of customary international law. So far, 
this opposition is only expressed in international documents set up by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and by the Council of Europe, 
namely the 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights14 and the 
1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.15 It is their drafting histories 
and various reports that support the argument for an evolving customary prohibition of germ-
line interventions for non-therapeutic purposes. In chapter II, I will discuss in detail how those 
regulations as well as UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 
October 200516 deal with said ambiguities and the conflict of supposedly permissive and 
restrictive human rights. Since those texts still form a rather incoherent picture and 
international consensus is needed I will suggest the drafting of a new declaration that clearly 
prohibits germ-line interventions for non-therapeutic purposes. It is designed for endorsement 
by UNESCO’s General Conference or the UN General Assembly and could eventually be an 
initial step toward the preparation and conclusion of a binding convention.17
Limited space demands several limitations to the scope of this treatise. Firstly, I will 
only focus on direct germ-line interventions. Indirect interventions prevent the birth of 
individuals with unwanted traits, whereas direct interventions immediately interfere with a 
future person’s genetic material, which poses different legal and ethical questions. Hence, 
whenever the term “germ-line intervention” is used hereinafter it describes direct germ-line 
interventions. Secondly, the legal issues of the patentability of genes and the overall legality
of genome interventions are only partly congruent. Even proponents of patent protection for 
                                                
14 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, adopted by the General Conference of 
UNESCO at its 29th session, 11 Nov 1997, UN Doc ST/HR/1/Rev.6(Vol.I/Part1) 459-464 (2002).
15 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine, opened for signature 4 April 1997, ETS No 164 (entered into force 1 
December 1999) (‘Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’).
16 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005, General 
Conference of UNESCO, 33rd sess, UNESCO < http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.phpRL_ID=1883&URL_ 
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html > at 21 October 2007 (‘Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights’).
17 See also Noëlle Lenoir, ‘Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal and 
Ethical Framework at the Global Level’ (1998-1999) 30 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 537, 549-550.
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human genes stress that patents would not allow the patent-holders to interfere with the gene 
as they please.18 For this reason, I will not address the human right to the protection of 
intellectual property19 and aspects of world trade law. Thirdly, feasible medical procedures 
are still a distant prospect and experiments on humans will be inevitable to make the 
application of germ-line interventions safe. Those procedures will pose challenges to the 
human rights framework themselves but cannot be addressed here. Finally, this article merely 
examines the interrelations of human rights between individuals – born and yet unborn. In this 
context, States act as mediators entitled to balance those rights rather than mere executers of 
state authority.20 That is not to say that there is no danger of coercive governmental policies in 
the sense of enforced genetic treatment.21 Needless to say that those and other important 
ethical and moral questions on eugenics further complicate the legal situation and require 
more attention than I can pay here. 
The notion of eugenics casts its shadow in large parts because of the hideous ways in 
which eugenic practices were pursued in the first half of the 20th century, particularly in Nazi 
Germany.22 Nowadays, the endeavour to make the benefits of germ-line interventions 
accessible and at the same time avoid hazardous and abusive developments determines the 
discussion. As I will show later, this is the case in both the philosophical and the legal world. 
Since the notions of genetic engineering and eugenics still are a red rag to many people, it is 
essential to know what germ-line interventions are and what they can do. Hence, I will use the 
following chapter for a short introduction to genomics. For the sake of a better understanding 
the descriptions are simplified and limited to the aspects relevant for our topic. 
II. GENOMICS IN A NUTSHELL
The Human Genome
As far as scientists know today every living organism possesses a genome containing the 
biological information needed for the construction and maintenance of a living example of 
that organism.23 Apart from a few viruses, all genomes are made of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA). DNA is a substantially long molecule made up of chains of nucleotides, which consist 
                                                
18 Shira Pridan-Frank ‘Human Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law’ (2002) 40 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 619, 630.
19 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, above n 14, art 27(2).
20 Munayyer, above n 8, 690.
21 For example, China’s Law on Maternal and Infant Health of 1995, though supposedly not motivated by racism 
but by a desire to reduce birth defects, imposes decisions on couples for eugenic reasons. See Qiu Renzong, Is 
Chinas Law Eugenic?- ‘A Concern for Collective Good’ and the critical response by Frank Dikötter, Is Chinas 
Law Eugenic? – ‘The Legislation Imposes Decisions’ (1999) UNESCO Courier <http://www.unesco.org/ 
courier/1999_09/uk/dossier/txt07.htm> at 21 October 2007.
22 Buchanan et al, above n 3, 60.
23 See generally T.A. Brown, Genomes (1999).
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of a sugar and a phosphate group and one of the four bases adenine, cytosine, guanine and 
thymine. Two strands of DNA create the well-known double helix structure, held together by 
hydrogen bonds between the bases, which group in pairs of adenine and thymine or guanine 
and cytosine. Genes are distinct sequences on the double helix that contain the information 
that is essential for the construction and regulation of specific molecules that function as the 
organism’s construction and maintenance crew. Every human nuclear genome contains 
approximately 30,000 genes,24 which can be associated with certain functions or traits of the 
individual organism. The specific composition of an individual gene might determine, for 
example, if a human being has blue or brown eyes. However, in most cases the situation is
more complex. Scientists consider it unlikely that variations within a single human gene fully 
determine the genetic predisposition for a certain trait. They consider the interaction of genes 
and the interplay between genes and environment to be the norm with regard to traits and also 
to hereditary diseases.25 Despite these complex interrelations and the controversy on the 
heritability of behavioural traits, scientists hope that genes can play an important role in the 
treatment of hereditary diseases and the suppression of “undesirable” characteristics. Since
the isolation of single genes and identification of associated traits are time-consuming and 
expensive, the Human Genome Project (HGP) was established in the late 1980s as a loose but 
organized collaboration between geneticists worldwide. The task of sequencing 3x109 human 
base pairs was realized on 26 June 2000 when the first draft of the human genome sequence 
was announced. On 14 April 2003, the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 
declared the successful completion of the project. From then on, the emphasis in research 
shifted from the question what the genome is to the question what it does.26 It does not come 
as a surprise that the second question proved to be even more complicated than the first.   
Human Germ-line Interventions
The term “human genome” describes the genomes of many different individuals and the 
collected knowledge of their genetic characteristics. Apart from identical twins, no two 
individuals in the world have an identical genome. However, one can speak of the human 
genome since differences between individuals are generated from an overall variation of only 
                                                
24 Roger C. Green, ‘Human Genetic Diseases’ in Christoph W. Sensen (ed) Handbook of Genome Research
(2005) vol.1, 81, 81.
25 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Explanatory Report
(1996) [79] Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/164.htm> at 21 October 
2007 (‘Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Explanatory Report‘).
26 Brown, ibid 388;  Nicholl, above n 4, 175.
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0.1 per cent.27 An individual genome emerges from the process of human reproduction when 
mother and father randomly donate half of their DNA to the sex cells. These cells then, 
through a variety of processes, shuffle the genes into new combinations and eventually form 
the offspring’s genome. The genome is organized in 46 chromosomes, made up of 23 pairs, 
one member of each pair contributed by the mother, the other by the father. Hence, every gene 
exists in two copies but only one copy is expressed as a trait. The advantage of sexual 
reproduction as opposed to asexual reproduction is the large amount of variation in the 
offspring’s genes that makes the organism less susceptible to diseases. The downside of 
sexual reproduction is that the offspring also inherits genes that might be implicated in the 
causation of diseases. To identify and disarm those genes is the purpose of gene therapy. The 
alteration of genes is based on the premise that genetic information is a resource that can be 
manipulated to achieve certain goals in science and medicine.28
In a geneticist’s toolbox, we find instruments for the manipulation, cloning, screening 
and modification of genes. Germ-line interventions are realised by altering the genetic 
material in the reproductive cells of an adult. While this allows people to reproduce without 
worrying about the transfer of hereditary diseases to their offspring, complications of the 
“unnatural” genetic disposition cannot be ruled out. Genetic interventions could have an 
immediate, unforeseen and harmful effect on the child. They could also lurk in the 
background and manifest in later generations. The consequences for humankind could be 
disastrous since scientists have found out that in evolutionary history large-scale germ-line 
mutations within a species have usually been rather detrimental than beneficial.29 When the 
basic tools to recombine DNA became available in the 1970s it was already understood that 
‘the new technology could give rise to potentially harmful organisms, exhibiting undesirable 
characteristics.’30 At the same time, molecular biologists found it reasonable that 
keeping diabetics alive with insulin, which increases the propagation of an inherited 
disease, seems justified only if one ultimately is willing to do genetic engineering to 
remove diabetes from the germline and thus save the anguish and cost to millions of 
diabetics.31
                                                
27 Nicholl, above n 4, 169.
28 Ibid 3.
29 David Bricker, A New Hypothesis on the Origin of ‘Junk’ DNA (2003) Innovations-Report, Forum for Science, 
Industry and Business <http://www.innovations-report.com/html/reports/life_sciences/report-23583.html> at 21 
October 2007.
30 Nicholl, above n 4, 6.
31 Koshland Jr, above n 2, 12.
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Supporters of this opinion regard the fears of detrimental consequences for future generations 
as too speculative to justify denying the benefits of germ-line interventions to more immediate 
offspring.32 Not only for them, the idea to eradicate at least the prevalent genetic diseases like 
Down’s syndrome (Trisomy-21) or mucoviscidosis (cystic fibrosis) is very tempting. 
Scientists have already managed to connect numerous hereditary diseases with certain 
genes.33 However, in a book on genome research published in 2005, the author Roger Green 
stated that even where the underlying patho-physiology was known and access to the critical 
cell was feasible, advances in gene therapy of inherited diseases have been few.34 Altogether, 
the huge number of genomes and the expected slow dissemination of “healthy specimens” 
render ‘the elimination of “harmful” genes from entire human populations […] more utopian 
than realistic.’35 Yet the potential threat is taken so seriously that the Swiss constitution goes 
so far as to prohibit even the transfer of non-human genetic material into the human 
genome,36 a procedure even more controversial than germ-line interventions. All this 
illustrates that the discussion on germ-line interventions is far ahead of scientific progress. 
Some hope that this condition will prevent harmful developments and favour less 
controversial alternatives;37 others fear that premature limitations might overlook the benefits 
of genomics. 
But how should we handle “abnormal” genetic constellations that benefit a person. A 
well-known example is the protection from contracting malaria if a person carries only one 
copy of the gene for sickle-cell disease.38 The eradication of “abnormal” genes might 
therefore hinder unforeseen beneficial developments. In addition, some diseased genes could 
have positive effects on some people’s lives and even humankind as a whole. The question 
arises whether we want to prevent persons with a genetic predisposition for bipolar disorder 
                                                
32 John A. Robertson, Children of Choice – Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (1994) 162.
33 See the more than 16,000 entries in the database Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man™ (2000) McKusick-
Nathans Institute for Genetic Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, and National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, National Library of Medicine <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/omim/> at 21 October 2007.
34 Green, above n 24, 87.
35 Hans Galjaard, Report of the IBC on Pre-Implantation Diagnosis and Germ-line Intervention, [82], UNESCO 
Doc SHS-EST/02/CIB-9/2(Rev.3) (2003).
36 Art.119(2)(b): ‘le patrimoine génétique et germinal non humain ne peut être ni transféré dans le patrimoine 
germinal humain ni fusionné avec celui-ci’ Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse (2005) 
Confoederatio Helvetica <http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/101/a119.html> at 21 October 2007.
37 such as somatic cell interventions, donations of genetically “healthy” eggs and sperms, prenatal diagnosis, 
embryo selection and abortion; see Council for Responsible Genetics, Human Germline Manipulation (2000) 
Council for Responsible Genetics <http://www.gene-watch.org/programs/cloning/germline-position.html> at 21 
October 2007; Harold Edgar and Thomas Tursz, Report on Human Gene Therapy, UNESCO Doc SHS-
94/CONF.011/8, 15-6 (1994).
38 Control of Genetic Diseases, Report of the Secretariat of the World Health Organization, 21 April 2005, WHO
Doc EB116/3 (2005) para 3 (‘Control of Genetic Diseases’).
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when this mood disorder has had influence on the work of so many outstanding artists.39
Would theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking’s mind have been as brilliant if his parents had 
decided to switch off the gene that causes motor neurone diseases?40 Significantly, his own 
statements on his defect reveal that the diagnosis gave new impetus to his life and research.41
For that reason it is not surprising that a working group of UNESCO’s International Bioethics 
Committee (IBC) found in 1994 that it ‘would not categorically oppose any and all 
imaginable intervention on the germ-line.’42 In a report of 2002, the World Health 
Organization concurred with that view.43 Despite this reluctance to generally ban germ-line 
interventions, most States in the early 90s endorsed their outright prohibition due to the 
insufficient knowledge to evaluate the risks to future generations.44 Still in 2003, the IBC 
stated that in most nations germ-line interventions had been ‘strongly discouraged or legally 
banned.’45
An explanation for this attitude could be the parallelism between genomics and the 
beginning of the atomic age, the weighing of pros and cons of immense powers that can be 
used for good and evil. Maybe the international community does not want to make the same 
mistakes again? As for nuclear powers, humankind – after a long period of arming and mutual 
deterrence – nowadays seeks to limit the use of atomic energy to peaceful purposes, but even 
minor accidents in nuclear power plants bear the risk of nuclear contamination and death. In 
addition, the discussions on the atomic programmes in Iran or North Korea, the back and forth 
between India and Pakistan, and the mystery-mongering about the Israeli atomic programme 
reveal that there can be no certainty. Does international law provide promising means to take 
influence on scientific progress and the control of risky developments? Some scholars argue 
that it is science and technology that determine or alter the ends, means and structures of 
international law46 and not vice versa. From a positivist’s point of view, a more optimistic 
                                                
39 See generally Kay Redfield Jamison, Touched with Fire: Manic-Depressive Illness and the Artistic 
Temperament (1993).
40 I don’t know the actual cause of Stephen Hawking’s disease. I am also aware of the fact that only 5-10 per 
cent of cases of motor neurone diseases are identified as genetic/hereditary. See generally MND Association, 
Causes of MND (2005) Motor Neurone Association <http://www.mndassociation.org/research/research 
_explained/causes/index.html> at 21 October 2007. 
41 Stephen Hawking, My experience with ALS (2005) Professor Stephen W. Hawking's web pages 
<http://www.hawking.org.uk/disable/dindex.html> at 21 October 2007.
42 Edgar and Tursz, ibid 17.
43 World Health Organization (ed) Genomics and World Health, Report of the Advisory Committee on Health 
Research (2002) 113 (‘WHO-Report’).
44 Edgar and Tursz, above n 37, 14; see also Tom Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge (1993) 158.
45 Galjaard, above n 35, para 100.
46 Joseph W. Dellapenna, ‘Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology with 
International Law’ (1999-2000) 88 Kentucky Law Journal 809, 881.
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standpoint is to say that ‘human must give directions to science’47 and that international law 
could provide the according means. Despite said shortcomings of the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons48 I would like to join the chorus of optimists and predict 
that international law will play an important role in the history of germ-line interventions. The 
spirits, the natural powers that could ignore our commands, have not been cited yet.49 In 
contrast to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this time the international 
community has the chance to take influence on scientific progress before it is happening. As a 
starting point, I will use the following chapter to present current international regulations 
dealing with germ-line interventions.
III. GENOMICS-SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL LAW  
In the discussion on genomes, two camps of international lawyers have manifested at both 
sides of the spectrum. Those stressing the benefits of germ-line interventions interpret certain 
human rights provisions as being in favour of the procedure and say that ‘international human 
rights law does not go as far as the species preservation advocates sometimes claim.’50
Opponents invoke the concept of human dignity and emphasise the biological dangers and 
ethical concerns connected to genomics. Trying to find out which side had the better 
arguments, I realized that at first sight the most relevant international human rights standards 
lent themselves to both sides of the argument51. An example for such a Janus-faced human 
right would be the right to health that could promote genomics for their potential to improve 
individual health and at the same time restrict genomics for their potential to diminish the 
fitness of the human species. Hence, both camps of lawyers seem to have their point. Other 
relevant rights, such as the right of future generations to be free of genetic alterations made 
without their consent, the child’s right to an untouched genetic inheritance or the collective 
human right to live in a world that is genetically diverse52 are recent appearances on the 
international stage and can hardly be regarded as recognized human rights. As we will see 
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later, particular difficulties arise when we invoke the rights and interests of future generations 
in order to limit human rights of living individuals. 
The following analysis of regulations on biomedicine, particularly the 1997 Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,53 the 1997 European Convention on 
Human Rights54 and the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights55 is 
meant to reveal which rights their drafters considered significant and how they solved the 
problem of Janus-faced rights. In chapter III, a close look at the different rights will clarify 
whether the human rights framework lends more to a permissive or to a restrictive policy 
towards germ-line interventions. At first, however, I will show why germ-line interventions 
are a topic for international human rights law at all.
The Genome as an Object of Public International Law
Depictions of a future society of enhanced individuals have a tendency to dystopias such as 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World or Andrew Niccol’s Gattaca.56 Unforeseeable biological 
consequences of an altered gene pool and social animosity triggered by genetic determinism
are the major concerns that have hitherto limited unbridled scientific research. According to 
biologist Desmond S.T. Nicholl, the biological community has self-imposed regulations that 
limit the progress in contentious cases.57 His answer to ethical concerns is a ‘common sense 
and a solid regulatory framework.’58 Such a regulatory framework, however, is not easily 
achieved, especially when ‘there are no “correct” answers, as each must be addressed from 
the perspective of the individual, family, society, race or nation that is facing up to the 
situation.’59 Several States such as Germany, Hungary, Norway or Israel have already 
implemented total bans on attempts to modify the germ-line, as mentioned above, the 
prohibition of germ-line interventions is even laid down in the Swiss constitution.60 Other 
states such as Brazil, Finland or France make exceptions for the treatment of severe genetic 
defects or hereditary diseases.61 However, this patchwork of different solutions is not 
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desirable. As a matter of fact, the natural spread of genetic material across national borders 
would soon introduce altered genomes into societies that have decided against germ-line 
interventions. Hence, Nicholl’s suggestion to give authority over their genetic material to 
different units of society is a mixed blessing. An individual who secretly had his or her own 
genome changed could easily sabotage the sexual partner’s decision not to take influence on 
his or her germ cells. On a global level, a permissive policy in some and a restrictive policy in 
other States would pose a new challenge to the international community. Conservative States 
would have to decide between the adoption of equally permissive regulations and the 
banishment of citizens from liberal States in order to protect their “national gene pool” from 
manipulated genomes. Article 19(4) of the Biodiversity Convention of 1992, which obliges 
States to provide ‘any available information on the potential adverse impact of the specific 
organisms [resulting from biotechnology] concerned to the Contracting Party into which those 
organisms are to be introduced,‘62 contains a less drastic rule for non-human material but is 
certainly not feasible for globe-trotting human beings. In addition, the gap between 
developing and industrialised countries might widen even more since genetic enhancement 
procedures will probably be available in developed countries first.63 There can be no doubt 
that those scenarios would lead to an undesirable disintegration of nations. 
Questions of genomics should therefore be solved, some might say: can only be 
solved, on an international level. So far, the discussion on the protection and beneficial use of 
the genome by the international community has spawned three major conventions and 
declarations, however, with differing content. Research workers feel that this ‘multiplicity of 
standards and rules and the variability used to describe the same reality is detrimental’ to their 
work and demand a harmonisation.64 Different cultural and religious world-views render such 
an endeavour extremely difficult. As I will show now today’s incoherent legal situation 
mirrors this complexity. 
The 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine was the first treaty to 
specifically deal with genomics. It allows modifications ‘undertaken for preventive, 
diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in 
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the genome of any descendants.’65 Thus, it prohibits direct germ-line interventions. Since 
somatic cell interventions can have unwanted side effects on the germ-line, the convention 
only prohibits interventions aimed to modify germ cells. Even though therapeutic germ-line 
interventions were not generally excepted from the ban medical purposes were given due 
regard in some cases. For example, the convention allows the choice of a future child’s sex 
during medically assisted procreation if it serves the prevention of sex-related hereditary 
diseases.66  
From the explanatory report we can tell that despite the positive perspectives of direct 
germ-line interventions the drafters were more concerned about the biological danger for the 
human species and the production of ‘individuals or entire groups endowed with particular 
characteristics and required qualities.’67 At the centre of the convention is the primacy of the 
human being over the sole interest of science or society.68 It is the fundament for the 
numerous provisions that focus on the protection of individual persons from experimental or 
coercive treatments.69 In connection with germ-line interventions, however, the pre-eminence 
of the individual cannot be the underlying concept since the individual interest to have healthy 
children would certainly favour them, so does the child’s interest to be born healthy. 
Conversely, the protection of the genome serves the higher cause of the protection of the 
human species and the prevention of societal tension. This allows the conclusion that the 
prohibition of germ-line interventions is a conceptual alien in a convention that otherwise 
emphasises the protection of the individual. 
Unfortunately, neither the convention itself nor the explanatory report give a decent 
explanation for why the individuals’ interests have to give way to the interest of humanity as a 
whole in the context of germ-line interventions. The drafters’ wary approach to balance the 
pros and cons of germ-line interventions manifests only in the preamble of the convention 
where it says that ‘progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present 
and future generations.’70 Considering that the preamble was meant to infer ‘that progress, 
human benefit and protection can be reconciled if public awareness is aroused’71 one would 
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have hoped for a more detailed balancing of the human rights favouring and those opposing 
germ-line interventions. As mentioned before, such a discussion does not even appear in the 
explanatory report. As an optimist I would say that the lack of further debate makes the 
prohibition a definite authoritative tenet. However, an in depth consideration would certainly 
have enriched the discussion. It remains to say that of all the members of the Human Genome 
Project Consortium, only France has signed (but not ratified) the convention, while Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States have not.
The idea of an undisputed ban of germ-line interventions is supported by another 
European regulation. In 1998, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union stated in the introductory remarks to Directive 98/44/EC that there was ‘a consensus 
within the Community that interventions in the human germ line […] offends [sic] against 
ordre public and morality.’72 It therefore was ‘important to exclude unequivocally from 
patentability processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings.’73
Although this statement does not constitute a prohibition of germ-line interventions, it reveals 
that there was a strong European call to ban them. As we will see now, relevant global 
regulations did not echo this call.
The 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
UNESCO’s General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights more than six months after the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine had been signed. It bans practices contrary to human dignity but only 
reproductive cloning was expressly identified as such a practice.74 The task of identifying 
others was left to States and competent international organisations.75 Article 24 of the 
declaration addresses the topic of germ-line interventions and assigns the IBC to give advice 
‘in particular regarding the identification of practices that could be contrary to human dignity, 
such as germ-line interventions.’ The German proposal to amend an explicit prohibition of 
germ-line interventions was rejected by the other States.76
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Yet the declaration pays more attention to the conflict of interests than the Council of 
Europe’s convention. Although it partially covers the same topics77 it devotes a lot more time 
to the positive effects of genomics. Article 1 declares the human genome a common property 
or ‘heritage of humanity’ that ‘underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human 
family.’78 By this, the declaration acknowledges that groups of people can have a collective 
human dignity79 and implies that humankind, as a whole, has to take responsibility for both 
the benefits and the risks associated with genomics. In contrast to the Council of Europe’s 
text, the declaration even endorses research, recognising the potential of genomics to improve 
the health of individuals and humankind, recognising also the freedom of research and the 
right to benefit from scientific progress.80 At the same time, it warns of the ethical and social 
implications and highlights the need of an assessment of the risks and benefits pertaining to 
research on the human genome.81 In view of the cautious assessment of germ-line 
interventions in Article 24, however, it is surprising how the declaration explicitly encourages 
States to foster ‘research on the identification, prevention and treatment of genetically based 
and genetically influenced diseases.’82 Thus, while there is merit in the convention’s 
consideration of permissive and restrictive aspects, it remains a double entendre by avoiding a 
conclusion. 
There are two plausible reasons for this condition. The first is the purpose of the 
declaration, which was to draft a statement of universal bioethical principles that ‘generally 
does not directly address the details of the practices to which such principles might apply.’83
Apparently, the appearance of cloning was an exception ‘motivated by the drafters’ reactions 
to the news of the cloned sheep “Dolly” in Scotland.’84 The second, more relevant reason is 
UNESCO’s more liberal attitude towards germ-line interventions. Already in the IBC’s 
Report on Human Gene Therapy of 1994 the working group concluded that germ-line 
interventions ‘should not be categorically disallowed.’ 85 This was based on the assumption 
that some hereditary diseases were so grave that a benefit-cost analysis would justify their 
prevention even through risky germ-line interventions.86 It is likely that the considerations 
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expressed in this report also tipped the scale against an explicit prohibition of germ-line 
interventions in the 1997 Universal Declaration.
In this climate of indefiniteness, some members of the Third Committee voiced 
disapproval before the UN General Assembly endorsed the declaration in Resolution 
53/152.87 The New Zealand delegate criticised that the declaration had been ‘adopted in 
haste,’ and others, such as the Argentinean delegate, expressed that the declaration was ‘far 
from closing the debate on the potential ethical implications of scientific and technological 
progress’ and ‘was simply a starting point for that debate.’88 Said mandate to the IBC in 
Article 24 clearly underlines that statement’s validity. Regrettably, the IBC has drawn up only 
one according report so far89 and its substance is questionable.  Almost six years after the 
declaration had been adopted, the report merely quoted Article 24, repeating that ‘germ-line 
interventions could be contrary to human dignity.’90 The working group found ‘no reason to 
date to modify this position.’91 Hence, the IBC virtually evaded the answer or at least 
postponed it. All aspects considered, the declaration presents itself much more open to 
genomics than the European convention and it addresses more of the controversial topics. 
Instead of condemning germ-line interventions categorically, it presents the pros and cons. 
The flipside is the declaration’s avoidance of a clear statement. 
In the same year, UNESCO’s General Conference also adopted the Declaration of the 
Responsibilities of Present Generations towards Future Generations.92 Its Article 6 touches on 
the human genome and biodiversity, stating that
[t]he human genome, in full respect of the dignity of the human person and human 
rights, must be protected and biodiversity safeguarded. Scientific and technological 
progress should not in any way impair or compromise the preservation of the human 
and other species.
However, the recourse to indefinite wording leaves doubts as to the precise scope of the 
provision and does not contribute new aspects to the discussion. What can be said is that the 
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notions of protection of the genome and the prohibition to compromise the preservation of the 
human species seem to ban risky tampering with the genome, which could include germ-line 
interventions. Conversely, beneficial interventions would certainly be in the interest of future 
generations. In summary, we can state that the drafters of those two UNESCO documents of 
1997 wanted to make clear that the beneficial effects of germ-line interventions for medical 
purposes were not to be ignored. 
The 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights
In the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of October 200593 the IBC 
missed another opportunity to deal with the supposed conflict of germ-line interventions and 
human rights. While the text considers benefits and harms,94 social responsibility and health95
and the protection of biodiversity,96 the provision dealing with the protection of future 
generations is rather short. It states that ‘[t]he impact of life sciences on future generations, 
including on their genetic constitution, should be given due regard.’97 However, since the 
declaration was not meant to cover topics ‘already addressed by other instruments, notably the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights’98 this shortness is 
somewhat understandable. In fact, despite its name the Declaration may not cover germ-line 
interventions at all. Support for this assumption comes from the explanatory memorandum, 
which speaks of the 
responsibility towards the biosphere, [with regard to which] a special reference to 
future generations is made in the text to the safeguarding of interests in biodiversity 
and the biosphere that extend beyond the present generation.99
This vague statement has hardly any significance for the question of how international law 
should handle germ-line interventions. In addition, ‘life sciences’ in Article 16 only refer to 
‘any study or research discipline that contributes to the understanding of life processes.’100
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This definition does not fit germ-line interventions, which require the understanding of life 
processes more than they contribute to it. 
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Conclusion 
Not much has changed since Iulia-Antoanella Motoc presented her expanded working paper 
on human rights and bioethics to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council. In 2003, she wrote that ‘[t]aken 
together, the norms relating to the human genome form an incoherent picture.’101 My analysis 
has so far confirmed this perception. While the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine provides us with an unambiguous statement without further explanation, the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights goes into the discussion but 
evades a conclusion. This situation could be the result of their legal nature, the first being an 
international treaty, the second being a non-binding political declaration providing guidelines 
more than proscribing specific behaviour. Apart from that, the texts by UNESCO and the IBC 
undoubtedly convey a more open-minded attitude towards medical germ-line interventions 
than their European counterpart. In the light of the mandate to the IBC to determine if germ-
line interventions violate human dignity, the following chapter shall position germ-line 
interventions in the present framework of human rights and human dignity. 
IV. GENOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
As noted earlier, human rights are ambiguous when used as arguments for or against 
genomics. However, ‘[m]uch of the extant literature on ethical and social issues is concerned 
with “freedoms from…”’,102 somewhat ignoring that there also might be “freedoms to” that 
favour genetic engineering. Declarations and treaties such as the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR),103 the 1966 International Covenants of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)104 and of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),105 the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)106 and the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons107 are relevant sources for the latter. They emphasise the primacy of 
individual liberties, the need to increase health and living standards, the necessity of 
preventing disabilities and the responsibility to provide offspring with the best possible 
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opportunities. Ironically, it is just the supposedly “forbidden fruit” of germ-line interventions 
that provides the most promising means to achieve those goals. On the other hand, germ-line 
interventions raise questions of human dignity and the potential jeopardy to future 
generations. What is the position of human rights law towards this conflict of interests? In the 
following paragraphs I will show that only the freedom of scientific research and the right to 
enjoy the benefits thereof support germ-line interventions. It will also become obvious that 
the recognition of rights of future generations in today’s human rights law is questionable. 
Nonetheless, considering the States’ unanimous opposition against germ-line interventions for 
non-therapeutic purposes, I will conclude that the freedom of scientific research and the right 
to enjoy its benefits are limited to supporting therapeutic germ-line interventions only. The 
draft declaration in the appendix to this article is meant to clarify the current situation. 
However, we should bear in mind that different moral and ethical convictions often determine 
the interpretation of legal texts. Therefore, I will attempt to stay as objective as possible in my 
analysis and give room to the full range of possible understandings. For further clarity, the 
following rights and freedoms are grouped in those that arguably support and those that 
arguably oppose germ-line interventions.
Germ-line Interventions and Permissive International Human Rights Law
Human autonomy stands in the centre of the human rights framework, which seeks to prevent 
the State’s interference with personal liberties and bodily integrity and to guarantee access to 
social and economic resources.108 Thus, human rights help individuals defend their integrity 
against public authorities. Sometimes, they also order States to provide individuals with the 
means to realise their rights. In the context of genomics, both aspects of human rights law are 
relevant. Procreative liberties and the freedom of scientific research could oppose a 
prohibition of germ-line interventions, while some rights of the child, the right to health and 
the right to benefit from scientific progress could require the provision of access to beneficial 
genomic technologies. Unless otherwise indicated, the following rights are to be interpreted as 
prima facie and thus subject to being limited by the opposing rights that will be dealt with in 
the second half of this chapter. At first, however, we will take a closer look at the concept of 
consent since human autonomy includes the freedom to consent even to perilous treatments. 
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(1) Consent
Article 7 of the ICCPR states that ‘no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.’109 Even though the provision covers hideous ‘criminal 
experiments on human beings such as those committed in Nazi concentration camps’110 the 
individual may still choose deliberately to undergo such a procedure. ‘Free consent’ means 
that individuals seem to be free to do what they wish to their bodies.111 For this reason, the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights112 and the European 
Convention on Bioethics and Human Rights113 provide that genetic treatment is subject to an 
individual’s prior, free and informed consent. Hence, every person could have the right to 
consent to germ-line interventions. The distinctive feature of germ-line interventions, 
however, is that they do not affect living individuals but their offspring. The question is now 
whether parents can consent on behalf of their unborn children. Although most international 
regulations contain articles on consent, they do not cover this specific aspect. 
With regard to Article 7 of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee showed 
general reluctance to allow a third party to consent on behalf of another person to any medical 
or scientific experimentation that may be detrimental to that person’s health, even if he or she 
was not capable of giving valid consent his- or herself.114 Due to this narrow interpretation of 
the provision it is unlikely to cover the consent on behalf of unborn children. By the same 
token, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights makes 
arrangements for the case that according to the law a person does not have the capacity to 
consent,115 but the wording leaves no doubt that this only applies to living persons. The 
declaration further covers the situation where a person is not in the position to consent, in 
which case consent or authorization shall be obtained in the manner prescribed by law, guided
by the person’s best interest.116 Although one might argue that an unborn child is not in the 
position to consent, Noëlle Lenoir, Chair of the IBC during the drafting of the declaration, 
points out that the provision is related ‘to sick or very young children.’117 In summary, we can 
say that consent as a legal construct that allows parents to decide on behalf of their future 
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children is unknown to international law. That is not to say that they do not have their own 
rights to carry out germ-line interventions, which could derive from their procreative liberties. 
(2) Procreative Liberties
The explanatory report to the European Convention on Bioethics and Human Rights states 
that parents have a right to carry out predictive genetic tests at the embryonic stage to find out 
whether an embryo carries hereditary traits that will lead to serious diseases in the future 
child.118 Should they not also have a right to take other counter-measures, especially when the 
alternative would be the abortion of the pregnancy? The European convention answers in the 
negative. Yet from a moral point of view, procreative liberties are extremely far-reaching. As 
a central part of many people’s life-plan, procreative liberties deserve a strong measure of 
respect in all reproductive activities.119 Among them, seeking to have healthy children and 
preventing severe birth defects are key aspects.120 Those who support the idea that the 
parents’ moral rights over their children cover germ-line interventions often underpin their 
argument under reference to the parents’ far-reaching discretion once a child is born. Societies 
expect parents to keep their offspring away from harmful activities and influences, to have 
them vaccinated against common childhood diseases and maybe even to insure that they 
maintain a balanced diet.121 At the same time, most societies respect pluralism and allow 
parents broad discretion to determine what is best for their children. Eventually, parents shape 
their children’s corporal and mental abilities through the environment they provide.122
Designing the offspring’s genome could therefore be regarded as an additional factor to 
support their health and development. Moral concerns would be sidelined. From a moral point 
of view, the child’s question “Who would I have been if my parents had not selected red hair 
for me before my birth?” seems as reasonable as the question “Who would I have been if my 
parents had not made me eat vegetarian food all the time after my birth”.123 Nevertheless, 
parents are not entitled to impose all their idiosyncratic attitudes and wishes on their children. 
They are not allowed to narrow their opportunities beyond a reasonable standard, i.e. they 
must leave the child with a range of opportunities to create his or her own plan of life.124
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Apart from that restriction, there seems to be no moral objection to parents using genetic 
interventions to produce the best offspring they can.125 But what is the best? And the best for 
whom, anyway? Social pressure of group inclusion and exclusion could unwittingly control 
parental decisions. Choice could turn into obligation whenever parents fear that they 
themselves or their children could become misfits if they refrain from germ-line interventions. 
This is why some scholars conclude that ‘[r]eproductive freedom and the liberty to construct 
and conduct a family life are potentially both enhanced and threatened by the genetic 
revolution.’126
It difficult to tell whether human rights have adopted the extensive moral scope of 
procreative liberties. Due to the vague wording of relevant provisions, the ‘content of 
reproductive rights remains hazy in international legal discourse.’127 As seen before, this 
vagueness is a common condition in the realm of procreative liberties in the human rights 
framework particularly with regard to genetic manipulations. A well-established human right 
is the right to found a family, laid down in Article 16 of the UDHR and Article 23(2) of the 
ICCPR. While the texts remain silent on what the right to found a family comprises, it is the 
common understanding that it obliges States not to interfere in relationships and to provide 
couples with the possibility of institutionalising their relationship.128 Whether it comprises the 
right to have a child is controversial in the case of Article 16 of the UDHR,129 but recognized 
as a core aspect of Article 23(2) of the ICCPR.130 The right supposedly covers both a State’s 
non-interference in procreation as well as the provision of access to techniques of artificial 
procreation.131 Legal restrictions are feasible but subject to thorough justification in the face 
of procreative liberties. However, restrictions of the right are likely to be permissible when it 
comes to ‘forms of genetic manipulation and experiments with embryos in the womb or in 
vitro.’132 In brief, the right to found a family covers access to artificial procreation but not 
necessarily to genetic modifications.
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 
constitutes a rare exception to the right’s usual haziness. The conference report held that 
‘reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national 
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laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents.’133
Subsequently, the report enumerated these rights and identified a ‘basic right of all couples 
and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their 
children and to have the information and means to do so.’134 It also claimed the existence of a 
‘right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health,‘ which includes the 
parents’ ‘right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and 
violence.’135 While these rights appear to focus more on the right to procreate at all than on a 
supposed right to a certain quality of the fruit of procreation, the report also touches upon the 
topic of the healthiest offspring possible. It indicates a ‘right of access to appropriate health-
care services that will […] provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant.’136
Undoubtedly, we could define germ-line interventions as a (future) health-care service that 
enhances the chances to give birth to a fit child. However, two aspects show us that this 
supposed right does not necessarily cover or demand germ-line interventions. First, using the 
words “best chance” reveals that chance shall still be the dominant factor not intended genetic 
interventions. Second, the report regarded the exercise of those rights as subject to responsible 
exercise, especially to the parents’ responsibilities towards the community.137 This rather 
vague exception certainly leaves broad discretion to States when they decide to limit 
procreative liberties. As for Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,138 which also contains the right to found a family, 
some commentators say, that as far as artificial reproduction is concerned, 
[i]t does not seem likely that the Convention imposes any limits on what choices a 
state may make and it is probably premature to decide that the Convention imposes a 
positive obligation on a state to legislate to allow any particular technique.139
We can say the same about germ-line interventions. Considering the controversy on those 
interventions, it is very unlikely that States would have difficulties to argue that germ-line 
interventions are not part of the right to found a family, which focuses on the right to have 
children rather than a right to have the “best possible” children. Then again, the right to have a 
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child could be invoked in the context of germ-line interventions in borderline cases where a 
hereditary disease would inevitably render a couple’s offspring seriously impaired and 
therefore would prevent them from having children at all. In those cases, a germ-line 
intervention could be the only way to exercise the right to have a child. However, in those 
cases States could fulfil their human rights obligations by providing procedures of 
adoption.140
In summary, the vagueness of procreative liberties in international law hinders the 
recognition of a right to germ-line interventions. While it is one thing to deny parents the right 
to genetic interventions on their offspring, it is another thing to deny children the right to a 
health and opportunities from the moment of their birth.  
(3) The Rights of the Child and Future Generations
Ten fingers, ten toes. 
That was all that used to matter.141
Every year, more than seven million children around the world are born with severe genetic 
disorders or birth defects.142 Around 90 per cent of them are born in mid- and low-income 
countries, however, genetic and congenetical disorders are also the second most common 
cause of infant and childhood death in the developed world.143 Those numbers make it 
obvious why germ-line interventions are a subject of great hopes. As mentioned earlier, 
societies usually expect parents to wish and do the best for their child. Nowadays, prenatal 
interventions to cure diseases or defects are quite common. The surgery on an embryo’s heart 
to save his or her life, for example, is ethically uncontroversial. This is not the case in the 
context of genomics where it is feared that children will become ‘objects or products chosen 
on the basis of their qualities, […], valued not for themselves but for the pleasure and 
satisfaction they will give parents.’144 As we will see in a later chapter, such an attitude could 
conflict with human dignity. Conversely, the prevention of hereditary diseases cannot be 
dismissed as a solely egoistic parental act. A child, genetically disburdened of a severe 
disease, would probably approve this genetic manipulation. Such an intervention would 
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certainly appear less invasive to him or her than curfews, diets, violin lessons or any other 
educational measures parents are legally entitled to impose on their children. A child might 
even blame (and sue?) parents for not having prevented an inherited disease. This is why 
many people think that the prevention of a disease that stands in the way of most or nearly 
any plan of life is not objectionable from a moral point of view.145
In the human rights framework, the rights of the child are compiled in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.146 Important for the discussion on genomics are the rights related 
to health of Article 24, the right to life, survival and development of Article 6, and the right to 
an adequate standard of living, Article 27. However, the object of protection of the CRC is the 
child after birth (in any case not earlier than after the moment of conception147) and the 
application of the CRC to future offspring bears some conceptual difficulties. While it ‘may 
not matter much whether action is based on a right to protection for the unborn child or the 
right of the born child to have a healthy beginning’148 it is certainly relevant for the 
application of the CRC that germ-line interventions take place before the conception of a 
child. Without the recognition of general obligations to un-conceived future generations it is a 
heavy burden to overcome this oddity and acknowledge a child’s right to the eradication of 
hereditary diseases from the CRC. Strictly speaking, the CRC is not applicable. From the 
drafters’ point of view, this is a reasonable consequence since the child would have to claim 
retroactively a right not to be born in the way he or she actually was. 
However, at least Article 24(2)(f) of the CRC implies the existence of a right that 
comes into effect before the child is conceived. The norm demands that States take 
appropriate measures to develop preventive health care and family planning education and 
services in order to implement the child’s right to health. Family planning includes, for 
example, the counselling concerning the risk of child death associated with childbearing by 
teenagers or with short-term inter-birth intervals.149 Since preventive measures against those 
risks and according counselling can take place only before the conception of a child, the 
object of protection must be a potential child. Hence, we can conclude from Article 24(2)(f) 
that international obligations towards potential children are conceivable, albeit not the rule 
under the CRC. Nonetheless, the CRC does not recognise a child’s right to be free of 
hereditary diseases. The opposite view would certainly be a misinterpretation of the CRC 
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since an according proposal to extend the protection of the CRC to the conceived but unborn 
child150 was not adopted and the ambit of the objects of protection must therefore be 
interpreted narrowly. 
Ignoring this objection for one moment, I want to show now that even with a radical 
interpretation of the obligations of the CRC we could not derive a right to germ-line 
interventions from the CRC at all. The child’s right to life in Article 6(1) of the CRC does not 
cover a right to a certain kind of life, nor does Article 27 entitle to certain living conditions 
beyond the environmental sphere of adequate food, clothing and housing.151 However, special 
mention needs to be made of Article 6(2) of the CRC, the right to survival and development. 
The rule obliges States to take positive steps to prolong the life of the child and to promote 
measures and conditions for his or her survival and development.152 Since severe diseases 
threaten the survival and hamper the development of the child, germ-line interventions 
provide the means to comply with the requirements of Article 6(2). The fact that States shall 
pursue those goals ‘to the maximum extent possible’153 further supports the argument for 
germ-line interventions. Conversely, the travaux préparatoires demand a different 
interpretation of this last phrase. Apparently, it was meant to indicate that States are allowed 
to consider economic, social and cultural conditions,154 hence that they are entitled to consider 
a broad range of measures instead of being obliged to maximise the effects of single actions. 
The fact that the obligatory periodic reports on adopted measures only demand information 
about specific measures concerning the broad categories of the ‘physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral, psychological and social development,‘ preparing the child for an ‘individual life in a 
free society’155 underpins this argument. Once again, the rule’s vagueness prevents us from 
regarding Article 6(2) of the CRC as an obligation for States to provide access to germ-line 
interventions.  
Less vague than this norm is Article 24 of the CRC that contains the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. It added some innovative provisions to 
the general right to health of Article 12 of the ICESCR, which makes it worth mentioning at 
this stage. One of the special features of Article 24 is the demand for measures to combat 
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diseases through the application of readily available technology.156 The provision especially 
covers the situation of children in developing countries lacking basic supplies of food and 
health care.157 The combat of diseases therefore includes, inter alia, the immunisation against 
the common childhood diseases.158 Could this comprise a “genetic immunisation” once the 
technology is available? Quite accurately, some philosophers draw parallels between germ-
line interventions enhancing the immune system and ordinary vaccinations.159 In neither case 
the child is asked for his or her consent but parents would make the decision with regard to 
the best interests of the child. The special emphasis on children’s health is also found in 
Article 12(2)(a) of the ICESCR that demands that States take steps necessary for the healthy 
development of the child. All aspects considered these norms have the potential to form a 
child’s right to be freed from hereditary diseases by germ-line interventions. However, 
supporters of such a right would have to wait until germ-line interventions have become a 
readily available technology whose risk-benefit ratio equals the one of immunisations against 
common childhood diseases. In addition, the parallel between immunisations and germ-line 
intervention only covers therapeutic germ-line interventions. Of course, the conceptual oddity 
of rights of non-existent children remains. For this, Article 3(1) of the CRC could provide a 
loophole, stating that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration for all 
actions concerning children. The norm also is a guideline to ‘evaluate laws, practices, and 
policies relating to children that are not covered by express obligations in the [CRC].’160
Hence, the “best interest of the child”-doctrine could have influence also on the question of 
germ-line interventions and the rights of future generations.  
Regrettably from the future generations’ point of view, the objects of protection of 
today’s international human rights law are identifiable individuals only. The idea of rights of 
future generations has gained little recognition in international law. It was regretted by some 
scholars that, despite its objective, the Declaration of the Responsibilities of Present 
Generations towards Future Generations161 is absent from the idea of rights of future 
generations and limited to moral responsibilities.162 However, without venturing too far into 
the realm of philosophy, one can say that the concept of rights of future generations is 
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plausible.163 At least international environmental law recognises obligations towards future 
generations to some extent in the form of the common heritage of humankind principle 
(CHH).164 The CHH governs the deep-sea beds, Antarctica, the moon and other celestial 
bodies, and certain worldwide historical sites. Nowadays, there is a noticeable movement to 
declare the human genome a common heritage of humankind.165 The Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights, for example, proclaims that the genome, ‘[i]n a 
symbolic sense, […] is the heritage of humanity.’166 The problem of the CHH, however, is 
that it does not dictate conclusive results. The interpretations of the scope and consequences 
of the CHH vary considerably, shaped by ideology, legal philosophy and political bias.167
Consequently, some argue that the application of the CHH to the genome would entail, inter 
alia, that all States share the responsibility for setting regulations and laws for permissible 
uses of the genome.168 Others conclude that it would disavow state sovereignty, and mandate 
that the benefits be allocated to all humankind, including future generations.169 Both 
approaches imply that beneficial interferences with the genome are permissible. In the same 
vein, Melissa Sturges included in her proposed treaty for the application of the CHH to the 
genome the ‘prohibition of an alteration of genes for any purpose except that which is 
necessary for the prevention of a deadly disease.’170 However, she was ambivalent concerning 
how deadly a disease needs to be to fall under the exception.171 Apart from its uncertainty, the 
application of the CHH on the human genome meets with other criticism. The parallel that is 
drawn between the traditional objects of protection and the genome is not conclusive. While 
the moon and Antarctica do not have a natural link to a person or a nation, every genome is 
intrinsically tied to a human individual who could claim the prerogative to govern his or her 
genome. Hence, the CHH cannot cope with individuals who want to tamper with their own 
genetic material. Altogether, even though the application of the CHH would entail every 
States’ obligation to consider the interests of future generations, the CHH does not suffice to
form an obligation to provide access to germ-line interventions for the good of future 
generations.
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Hence, subject to the conceptual difficulties and quite far from traditional interpretations, a 
child’s right to health could promote the legality of germ-line interventions. I will now try to 
verify this assumption in connection with the general right to health.
(4) The Right to Health
Since germ-line interventions are intended to improve the offspring’s health it is natural that 
the human right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health plays a pivotal role in the discussion. Article 12 of the ICESCR provides the most 
comprehensive codification of the right to health in international human rights law. Its second 
paragraph enumerates some of the steps to be taken by States to achieve the full realisation of 
the right. This includes the ‘prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.’172 At first sight, this provision could cover germ-line 
interventions since they make it possible to eradicate hereditary diseases. From a moral point 
of view, ‘[j]ustice may require genetic interventions to prevent disabilities because equality of 
opportunity is a component of justice and disabilities limit people’s opportunities.’173 Legally, 
however, the lack of conceptual clarity as to the content and scope of the right174 makes it 
difficult to derive clear-cut obligations from it. Nevertheless, the call for an affirmation of the 
human right to health creating ‘an obligation on the part of states and non-state entities alike 
to act in good faith to spread the life-saving benefits of the genome to all humankind’175 is 
loud. Since the ICESCR does not contain rights of future generations, the derivation of a right 
to germ-line interventions meets the same conceptual difficulties we have encountered in 
connection with the CRC. Hence, the following analysis is once again subject to severe 
conceptual objections.
For obvious practical reasons, States cannot guarantee good health and people cannot 
claim a human right to be healthy. The broad term “right to health” covers various aspects 
including the right to health care and to a number of underlying preconditions for health, such 
as safe drinking water and adequate sanitation.176 In fact, it is a right ‘to the enjoyment of a 
variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest 
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attainable standard of health.’177 States therefore have ‘to take positive measures that enable 
and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to health,’ e.g. through 
immunisation programmes against the major infectious diseases.178 Whether the prohibition of 
germ-line interventions conflicts with Article 12 of the ICESCR depends once again on the 
scope of the right to health. 
In order not to make the right a comprehensive but meaningless paper tiger, efforts 
have been made to define a core content of the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health.179 Though not uncontested, the core obligations comprise a healthy environment, the 
non-discriminatory access to health services, a minimum of food supply and nutrition, the 
provision of essential drugs and immunisation against the major infectious diseases as well as 
the appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries.180 According to the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the prevention, treatment and control of 
epidemic and endemic diseases and the immunization against the major infectious diseases 
occurring in the community are not part of but have comparable priority to the core 
obligations.181 The Committee found that the control of diseases as laid down in Article 
12(2)(c) of the ICESCR refers to 
States’ individual and joined efforts to, inter alia, make available relevant 
technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on 
a disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of immunization 
programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control.182
Two aspects of the Committee’s general comment deserve closer attention. First, the wording 
of the provision as well as the Committee’s interpretation entirely focus on infectious diseases 
and epidemics rather than hereditary diseases. Second, it is quite significant for our topic that 
the Committee derives from the right to health not more than the obligation to refrain from 
‘prohibiting or impeding traditional preventive care, healing processes and medicines.’183 In 
conjunction with the already limited scope of core obligations, it seems that the right to health 
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would not stand in the way of a prohibition of the controversial future technique of germ-line 
interventions.
Apart from this widely accepted reading and the identification of core obligations, the 
wording of Article 12(1),(2)(c) of the ICESCR promises a broader scope of application, 
laying down the majestic and inspiring idea of a right to the highest attainable standard of 
health realized, inter alia, by the prevention of diseases. The genetic eradication of a diseased 
gene would certainly mean an important contribution to the highest attainable standard of 
health, not only for one individual but also for the whole family line. In a recent report, the 
secretariat of the WHO suggested that 
[t]he control of genetic diseases should be based on an integrated and comprehensive 
strategy combining best possible treatment and prevention through community 
education, population screening, genetic counselling and the availability of early 
diagnosis.184
This means that prevention is meant to be achieved by empowering couples to make their own 
informed procreative decisions through genetic counselling, e.g. the detection of genetic risks 
or the encouragement of reproduction at optimal maternal ages.185 As far as genetic 
interventions are concerned, the report shortly refers to the future possibilities of somatic-cell 
gene therapy and states that ‘it will take years before this becomes clinical practice.’186
It is quite significant that a report on the control of genetic diseases by the WHO, 
which was the first organization to formulate an explicit right to health,187 takes no notice of 
germ-line interventions at all. In general, the WHO seem to be rather reluctant to pay a great 
deal of attention to germ-line interventions mainly because it considers them a distant 
prospect.  With no sufficient knowledge on actual benefits and risks the organisation regards 
any judgement as premature,188 while ‘claims for the medical benefits of genomics have 
undoubtedly been exaggerated, particularly with respect to the time-scales required for them 
to come to fruition.’189 It speaks volumes that the WHO as an organisation that has dedicated 
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itself to the advancement of the right to health in international law190 is far from associating 
germ-line interventions with this right. All aspects considered, it certainly remains a radical 
idea to include germ-line interventions in the right to health of Article 12 of the ICESCR.
Even if the technology was readily available, supporters of such a radical 
interpretation of the right to health would face another problem. Since the right only refers to 
a better health standard, it would be crucial to distinguish between interventions that 
constitute treatment of diseases and those serving the mere enhancement of the individual. 
This distinction is particularly relevant since objections against the treatment of diseases are 
mainly based on the biological risks for future generations, whereas the enhancement of 
human traits meets with the fundamental moral criticism that we do not have the right to 
predetermine the characteristics of future individuals and impose our conceptions of good and 
bad on them.191 Both in the legal and the moral sphere, the distinction remains very 
complicated since there is no universally acknowledged concept of disease.192 Should we 
make a difference between a child with a prospect of reaching a height of 1.60 meters because 
of his parents’ shortness and a child with the same prospect, whose parents are tall but who 
suffers from a growth hormone deficiency? Considering that one can hardly claim that the 
human immune system does not work properly without vaccinations, is the common 
vaccination against flu a preventive treatment or an enhancement? Since the dividing line 
blurs in practice groups with different norms and values would probably decide those 
borderline cases differently.193 Of course, just because the distinction is difficult and 
enhancements are morally questionable, it does not mean that necessarily all germ-line 
interventions should be prohibited. However, the slippery slope from therapeutic interventions 
to interventions motivated by vanity remains one of the major objections against all kinds of 
direct germ-line interventions. 
In the light of the above, it is questionable if the right to health stands in the way of 
prohibitions of germ-line interventions. This is also true for the rights of the child, which I 
had already identified as possible supporters of such genetic interferences. However, we can 
say that once those interventions are reasonably safe and their benefits clearly outweigh their 
risks, a new assessment will be required. For the time being, we have to content ourselves 
with this result since any anticipated judgment would have to be highly speculative. A lot 
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depends on the scientific progress, which we will turn to now in the context of the human 
rights to benefit from scientific progress and the freedom of scientific research.
(5) The Right to Benefit from Scientific Progress and the Freedom of Scientific Research
Article 27(1) of the UDHR contains the freedom of scientific research and the individual’s 
right to enjoy the benefits thereof. This right is also laid down in article 15(1)(b) of the 
ICESCR. The freedom of scientific research ranks so high among the rights and freedoms in 
international law that the discussion deals more with limitations of academic liberties rather 
than the struggle to implement them. During the discussions on the UDHR in the third 
committee of the UN General Assembly, delegates expressed their opinion that democracy 
and politics should serve science rather than vice versa.194 About half a decade later, the 
explanatory report on the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine confirmed 
that 
[f]reedom of scientific research in the field of biology and medicine is justified not 
only by humanity’s right to knowledge but also by the considerable progress its results 
may bring in terms of the health and well-being of persons.195
Its companion, the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications, appears to have an ‘enormous potential for further development in law and 
society.’196 At the same time, it has not been explored much since other rights usually cover 
the progress once it has become standard.197 The enjoyment of benefits is achieved through 
the retrieval of information about progress as much as through the access to the relevant 
applications.198 The access to germ-line interventions surely falls into the scope of the right, 
since scientific progress particularly includes natural and biological sciences.199 In the context 
of medicine, it was said that 
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[w]hen significant new treatments are discovered which make it possible to cure 
diseases which were in the past incurable, the state must be considered obliged, within 
the limits of its available resources, to make that treatment available.200
Despite these statements in favour of the freedom of scientific research and the individual’s 
right to enjoy its benefits, research is not unbridled. The UN General Assembly noted in 1975 
that ‘scientific and technological progress has become one of the most important factors in the 
development of human society’ but that it can also ‘give rise to social problems, as well as 
threaten the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual.’201 As for the freedom 
of scientific research States are entitled to prevent the use of scientific and technical progress 
for purposes contrary to the enjoyment of other human rights.202 UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights reflects the drafters’ understanding 
that research is a fundamental aspect of humanity and restrictions have to be interpreted 
narrowly. They can only be justified through the human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
human dignity of other individuals, as well as the protection of public health.203 Article 4 of 
the ICESCR, for example, explicitly allows for 
such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with 
the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare 
in a democratic society.
Hence, both the freedom of scientific research and the individual’s right to enjoy the benefits 
thereof are subject to their compatibility with other human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
human dignity. 
In conclusion, the freedom of scientific research and the right to enjoy the benefits 
thereof prima facie cover the research on germ-line interventions and their later application. 
Research is necessary to make the genetic procedures safe. Once this is achieved, people 
could have a right to benefit from them. This is particularly the case if one stresses the 
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beneficial aspects of therapeutic germ-line interventions and ignores the potential risks. 
Nonetheless, the uncertainty about long-term effects and the moral uneasiness caused by the 
interference with another individual’s genetic dispositions remain. As mentioned above, those 
objections could be expressed on the basis of human dignity and the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others. Before I turn to the question of whether those rights demand 
a prohibition of germ-line interventions and limit the freedom of research and its application, I 
will shortly sum up the results of the analysis so far.
(6) Conclusion 
Apparently, there are no convincing ways to support a parents’ or child’s right to germ-line 
interventions unless one chooses a very radical interpretation of the according provisions. 
Although there is a noticeable tendency among philosophers and medics to stress the 
beneficial sides of eugenics and the moral obligation to spare future generations the scourge 
of severe diseases such an obligation does not have a legal counterpart. Of course, since 
widespread germ-line interventions are still dreams of the future, there was no real chance for 
international law to develop rights that explicitly promote them. Nevertheless, the realms of 
ethics and law alike support the enquiring mind and scientific curiosity. It is for this reason 
that I have argued that the freedom of scientific research and the human right to benefit from 
its applications support the research on beneficial uses of germ-line interventions. Since little 
is known about their actual consequences, more research would be necessary to be able to 
achieve an accurate risk-benefit ratio. Conversely, international law that deals with 
biomedicine and anticipates scientific development tends to be restrictive rather than 
permissive. This is not only the case with the texts on germ-line interventions but can also be 
seen in the case of reproductive cloning. The European Anti-Cloning Protocol, for example, 
prohibits reproductive cloning and justifies the prohibition with the supposed violation of 
human dignity and the ‘serious difficulties of a medical, psychological and social nature that 
such a deliberate biomedical practice might imply for all the individuals involved.’204 On the 
global level, however, a binding prohibition of reproductive cloning is hindered by 
‘uncertainty over new scientific advances, as well as its ethical, cultural and religious 
implications.’205 The uneasiness expressed in the Universal Declaration on the Human 
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Genome and Human Rights and, in contrast to that, the explicit prohibition of germ-line 
interventions in the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine also reflect this 
discrepancy between regional and global arrangements. The paper will now attempt to 
determine whether there are aspects of international law that conclusively stipulate the 
prohibition of germ-line interventions and thereby limit the freedom of scientific research and 
the right to enjoy the benefits thereof.
Genome Interventions and Restrictive International Law 
Despite all prophecies of doom, the aim of a better, healthier life for every human being is 
unexceptionable. A ubiquitous human genetic modification practice will not necessarily result 
in the dystopian scenarios often envisaged. Public policy could avoid errors and abuses 
associated with the past eugenics and harness genetic powers to help create a more just and 
humane, particularly healthy society.206 In contrast, critics might say that despite the positive 
effects on human health genetic modification puts humankind on a slippery slope to an 
objectification of human beings who would be used as objects for secondary goals.207 It would 
be a short trip from preventing Down’s syndrome to preventing the birth of boys or girls 
(whichever seems more socially desirable), or from preventing children with genetic defects 
to children who lack intelligence, beauty or simply chances for success.208 Once the 
technology is available, social and economic pressure might urge parents to make use of it 
and might marginalize sexually perceived children. In the same vein, the IBC’s Report on 
Human Gene Therapy of 1994 stated that to direct evolution by choosing the traits and 
heightening the capacities of future generations ‘would violate fundamental rights of 
individuals so constructed.’209 However, the report is silent on the specific rights, a flaw I will 
try to iron out in the following pages.
(1) Human Dignity
Opponents of genetics and genomics tend to field human dignity as a rhetoric all-purpose tool 
against techniques they intuitively dislike.210 Human dignity is one of the few common values 
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in the world.211 However, we buy this unity with the extreme nebulousness of the concept. 
While the notion of human dignity appears in the Charter of the United Nations,212 the 
UDHR,213 the ICESCR and ICCPR214 and several other human rights treaties, no one has ever 
clearly defined it. Its interpretations vary considerably in different national and cultural 
backgrounds,215 and the endless discussions among philosophers over the last centuries fill 
books and libraries. It is, of course, not surprising that something so essential but yet as 
nebulous as human dignity eludes a universal definition. Therefore, the concept of human 
dignity is seldom able to provide concrete solutions on its own but, characterised as the 
backbone of human rights rather than being a human right itself,216 operates through concrete 
notions of specific human rights.217 For example, human dignity might help interpreting 
human rights in cases of ambiguity and tip the scales in cases where positive law reaches its 
limits. Its vagueness is curse and blessing at the same time. While it provides room for ethical 
discussions that are beyond the plain words of human rights treaties, commentators can also 
use it for their purposes and interpret it according to their own personal morals. As mentioned 
above, opponents of genomics invoke human dignity as a key objection against germ-line 
interventions. However, the following discussion will reveal that this is an arguable point of 
view. The first question is whether human dignity can theoretically collide with germ-line 
interventions at all. The second question is whether human dignity actually prohibits germ-
line interventions. Since the legal discussion on the notion of human dignity has a tendency to 
turn into a discussion on metaphysics and natural law, I will start with a brief insight into the 
philosophical discussion.  
It is widely recognized that human dignity is best defined negatively. Rather than 
giving a positive outline of the scope of the concept scholars prefer to identify the acts that 
violate human dignity. Over decades, various definitions have gained recognition, two of the 
most predominant I want to present here. German philosopher Immanuel Kant regarded 
violations of human dignity as the treatment of people only as a means and not as an end 
themselves.218 In the Kantian view, either things have a price and can be replaced by an
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equivalent, i.e. a mean that serves the same purpose, or they have a dignity, which makes 
them beyond price.219 Most of today’s definitions reflect the Kantian view and describe 
violations of human dignity as the treatment of a human being as a legal object of the will of 
others.220 In legal practice, this results in the priority of a person’s individual choices and the 
requirement of compelling reasons for interferences and means of coercion. Thus, States may 
not ‘extend their authority into areas of human life that are essentially personal and 
familial.’221
However, it is one thing to invoke human dignity in order to repel a State’s 
interference with personal matters. In the context of genomics, this would result in, for 
example, the protection of humans against a State’s coercive eugenic measures. As elaborated 
earlier, the drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights have chosen this 
approach.222 In contrast, it is quite another thing to protect someone’s human dignity against 
violations deliberately and consciously caused by that same someone. The somewhat 
paradoxical result would be that human dignity would conflict with human autonomy and 
self-determination – which form part of the concept of human dignity themselves. As a 
consequence, human dignity would lend itself to both sides of the argument. Kant tells us that 
in those cases human autonomy has to give way to dignity. Human beings could not sell 
themselves for a price without violating their duty of self-esteem.223 Others, following a 
rights- rather than Kant’s duty-led perspective, regard this limitation of free choice as 
‘misguided paternalism.’224 In connection with germ-line interventions the conflict between 
those opposing views is insignificant. Parents would not waive their own but their future 
offspring’s dignity. Here, we once again meet with the problem of rights of future 
generations. Considering that the UDHR merely acknowledges that ‘[a]ll human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights,’225 it is doubtful whether human dignity applies to 
generations not yet conceived. Kant’s so-called ‘kingdom of ends,’ for example, ‘is possible 
only through the autonomy, or the freedom of will, of its members. This autonomy is the 
ground of their absolute value, their “dignity”.’226 This implies that it requires living 
individuals with the competence to will. By the same token, supporters of the rights-led 
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approach admit that until they know if the offspring with a manipulated genome ‘might be 
regarded as inferior, leading to them valuing themselves less than those whose genome has 
not been so manipulated’ they are not sure whether human dignity is at stake at all.227
Consequently, they can only ‘place a question mark against the treatment of potential 
agents.’228 In conclusion, both approaches do not provide the means to let human dignity 
transcend generations. As opposed to the understanding that dignity derives from human 
rationality, others argue that human dignity simply derives from our belonging to the human 
species. Yet again, under this theory, it is only ‘straightforward to ascribe full rights to those 
who are conceived but not born,’229 but it does not give a satisfactory answer to the question 
of the human dignity of the not yet conceived. However, even though those theories do not 
necessarily support such an idea, this is not to say that a generic, abstract concept of human 
dignity is unthinkable.230
Noting that those philosophical approaches do not necessarily envisage the human 
dignity of generations not yet conceived, it is interesting to see how international law deals 
with that problem. The question is whether there is a metaphysical or natural law common to 
a timeless humanity as a whole that cannot be waived by anyone at anytime. Germ-line 
interventions can only violate human dignity if one answers this question in the affirmative. In 
1975, the UN Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests 
of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind231 stated that scientific and technological 
achievements could be used to the detriment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
the dignity of the human person. For the realm of genetics, the explanatory report on the 1997 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine acknowledged the problems 
biomedicine might pose not only to individuals and society but also to the human species 
itself.232 The drafters therefore included safeguards in the preamble, referring to the benefits 
to future generations and humanity as a whole233 – present and future. Conversely, the report 
makes clear that the convention is based on the ‘generally accepted principle that human 
                                                
227 Beyleveld and Brownsword, above n 210, 678.
228 Ibid.
229 Déirdre Dwyer, ’Beyond Autonomy: The Role of Dignity in “Biolaw”’ (2003) 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 319, 321.
230 See especially Roberto Andorno, Human Dignity and the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome 
(2003) [7] Cardiff Centre for Ethics, Law and Society <http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/publications/ 
2003/andornopaper.pdf> at 21 October 2007; Birnbacher, above n 210, 330.
231 UN Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the 
Benefit of Mankind, GA Res 3384 (XXX), UN GAOR, 30th sess, 2400th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/3384 (1975) 
art 8.
232 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Explanatory Report, above n 25, para 14.
233 Ibid.
  
43
dignity and the identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life began.’234
Hence, it would have been contradictory if the report had used human dignity as a basis for 
the prohibition of germ-line interventions in Article 13 of the convention. As noted earlier, the 
report does not give any reasons for the prohibition at all. We can only assume that the 
drafters were simply more afraid of the possible misuses of germ-line interventions than 
thrilled by the possible benefits, without further reference to legal justifications. 
In contrast, other legal texts strongly support the argument for the recognition of 
human dignity of future generations. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights reserves its first four articles to ‘[h]uman dignity and the human genome.’235
The idea of a dateless concept of human dignity shines through the statement that the genome 
underlies ‘the fundamental unity of all members of the human family’ and that it, ‘[i]n a 
symbolic sense, […] is the heritage of humanity.’236 Moreover, Article 24 of the declaration 
implies that future generations too can be protected by the concept of human dignity since it 
denominates germ-line interventions as a practice that could be contrary to human dignity. 
Unless the drafters thought that human dignity was generally capable to transcend to future 
generations, such a provision would be pointless. We find a similar situation in the provisions 
on human cloning. The Council of Europe’s 1998 Anti-Cloning Protocol states that ‘the 
instrumentalisation of human beings through the deliberate creation of genetically identical 
human beings is contrary to human dignity.’237 The explanatory report clarifies that the 
protocol outlaws ‘the instrumentalisation of artificially cloned human offspring’238 and 
thereby acknowledges that these non-existent clones can be protected by human dignity. Of 
course, considering that the UN Charter and the UDHR understand human dignity as 
belonging to humanity consisting of born human persons,239 this approach by the European 
Anti-Cloning Protocol must be regarded as a novelty in international law. However, only this 
understanding makes the invocation of the concept of human dignity against germ-line 
interventions possible. It is practically not important whether and how such an approach is 
feasible under metaphysics and natural law. What counts for the matters of this paper is that 
the drafters of the above provisions believed that it was. At the same time, they raised the 
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question if germ-line interventions actually violated human dignity,240 which we will turn to 
now. 
When it comes to genetics, the vagueness of the concept of human dignity is 
accompanied by, what professor of philosophy Kurt Bayertz called, a ‘great uneasiness.’241
The same uneasiness is omnipresent in the discussion on present technologies like in vitro
fertilization and prenatal diagnostics or surrogacy. The key objection against germ-line 
interventions is that they bring human beings into the realm of designed items subject to the 
fashions of the times242 or, as a UNESCO report put it, that germ-line interventions would be 
close to baking a cake.243 Noticeably, this vocabulary is in line with the definitions of 
violations of human dignity as the treatment of humans as objects. For this reason, one 
commentator goes so far as to demand that germ-line interventions should be declared crimes 
against humanity.244 On the other side of the spectrum, biologists like Richard Dawkins stated 
that humans are nothing but ‘survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to 
preserve the selfish molecules known as genes.’245 Others agree by saying that ‘[a] person is 
only a gene’s way of making another person.’246 Furthermore, it is argued that the natural 
gene pool never was static and never will be, since we have changed and evolved over time 
being in a state of constant mutation.247 As to the relationship of human beings to their genes, 
Dawkins also stated that
[t]he individual organism came first in the biologist’s consciousness, while the 
replicators – now known as genes – were seen as part of the machinery used by 
individual organisms. It requires a deliberate mental effort to turn biology the right 
way up again, and remind ourselves that the replicators came first, in importance as 
well as in history.248
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From that point of view, the development within the field of gene technology is 
“revolutionary” only with regard to its means and not with regard to its effects.249 However, 
for the Enquete Commission of the German Bundestag those revolutionary means violate 
human dignity. The commission stated that human dignity implies that humans are a product 
of chance, which secures the independence of human beings from each other.250
Unfortunately, it does not explain any further why human beings must be a product of chance. 
In contrast to Dawkins’ idea of the “selfish gene”, the underlying concept of the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is that ‘human beings cannot be 
reduced to the sum of their genes’ at all.251 It is argued that since we share 99 per cent of our 
DNA with chimpanzees, our humanness must have a spiritual rather than a material 
dimension.252 This means that interference with the genetic material does not violate human 
dignity because of the effects on the genome itself but because of the consequences for the 
self-understanding of humans. From this brief insight into the discussion, it is obvious that 
neither biologists nor international lawyers nor philosophers can provide a definitive answer, 
which is not surprising with regard to our pluralistic society and the broad scope of possible 
foundations and interpretations of human dignity. Hence, in the aftermath of the publication 
of the Enquete Commission’s report, German philosopher Hans-Martin Sass argued that ‘[t]he 
issue is not whether or not human dignity allows germ-line manipulation, but which forms of 
germ-line manipulations […] are morally acceptable and which are not.’253 According to Sass, 
only a public debate and discussions among professional organisations, regulators and 
legislators can give answers to those questions which could not ‘be predetermined by […] 
referring to obscure natural law concepts.’254 I find it reasonable to assume that the concept of 
human dignity cannot answer the question of the permissibility of germ-line interventions 
unless the international community or single nations decide that it should or should not. Even
at the end of such a debate, results can never be certain since the pluralistic moral world 
defies simplified heuristics. This is particularly true when this moral world shall come into 
effect through rigid legal terms. 
Some States will probably argue that any kind of direct germ-line intervention makes 
children the object of their parents’ personal, cultural or aesthetic desires and therefore 
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violates human dignity. Others could argue that, granted that it can be done safely, at least the 
treatment of severe diseases has nothing to do with parental idiosyncrasies and is a moral 
obligation towards future generations. Sceptics would then bring forward that once some 
germ-line interventions are permitted the term “disease” might be interpreted more and more 
widely. The intellectual quandary is that questions of procreation are a typical case of parental 
autonomy while the consequences of germ-line interventions might considerably affect 
societies and humanity as a whole. Both, parents who shape their children without limits and 
States that over-patronise their citizens leave a bitter aftertaste in the context of human 
dignity. So does the prospect of better lives for future generations compared to the risk for 
those generations of unforeseen, detrimental late-effects of germ-line interventions. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the debate on the violation of human dignity by germ-line 
interventions must result in an insoluble stalemate. This is not to say, however, that 
international law will not be able to find a definitive answer in terms of the international 
community’s smallest common denominator. So far, different assessments of the risk-benefit 
ratio have led to absolute prohibitions on the one side255 and the opposition against non-
therapeutic germ-line interventions on the other side.256 Instead of the vague concept of 
human dignity, these kinds of assessments should determine the future of germ-line 
interventions. However, this excursion to human dignity will turn out to be helpful for our 
analysis of other possible rights opposing germ-line interventions.
(2) The Rights of Others and Duties to Society
Article 29 of the UDHR makes it clear that human rights are the flipside of duties to society 
and are limited by ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ as well as ‘just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’257 It is unquestionable 
that ‘[s]ociety has good, if not conclusive, reason to restrict liberties of individuals if the 
exercise of these liberties undermines a public good.’258 The determination of a child’s sex 
serves as a very illustrative example for that. In some cultures it is still of great advantage to 
be male. However, if everyone became male, this would be a self-defeating development and 
pose dangers to the social and biological structure.259 The question is what rights could be 
invoked to protect future generations. I have already discussed that the idea of enforceable, 
                                                
255 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, above n 15, art 13.
256 Edgar and Tursz, above n 37, 17; Sturges, above n 9, 258; WHO-Report, above n 43, 113.
257 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, above n 13, art 29(2).
258 Buchanan et al, above n 3, 183+205.
259 Ibid 183. For the possible consequences of a society with too few women see e.g. Margaret Atwood’s novel A 
Handmaid’s Tale (1985). 
  
47
legal rights of future generations is not yet established.260 Nonetheless, a great number of 
splendid sounding rights circulate on the parquet of international law. Among them are the 
right of future generations to be free of genetic alterations made without their consent,261 the 
right of future generations not to be experimented upon,262 the child’s right to an untouched 
genetic inheritance263 or to being unplanned,264 or the collective human right to live in a world 
that is genetically diverse.265 However, they seem to be more of a moral rather than a legal 
nature. Bayertz notes that ‘[a]ll of these rights are the direct or indirect expression of certain 
values and ideas in life,’266 and, indeed, they seem to reflect more what some commentators 
think should be rather than what is. Attempts to establish such rights date back to as early as 
1982. Back then, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated in its 
Recommendation 934 on genetic engineering that ‘Articles 2 and 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights imply the right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not been 
artificially changed.’267 Such a right benefits future generations and covers children who are 
not yet conceived. Despite the very definitive tone this specific recommendation has two 
flaws. First, it is not absolute. Only two paragraphs later, the Assembly recommends that 
the recognition of this right must not impede development of the therapeutic 
applications of genetic engineering (gene therapy), which holds great promise for the 
treatment and eradication of certain diseases which are genetically transmitted.268
Hence, artificial changes are permitted for the purpose of gene therapy, which itself is not 
defined in the recommendation and therefore leaves room for broad interpretations. For this 
reason, the drafters envisaged but never implemented a list of illnesses to be permissible for 
gene therapy.269 Nevertheless, the fact that the Assembly did not dare to claim such a right 
without providing for the exception of therapeutic interventions makes it difficult to argue that 
there is an absolute right to an untouched genome. Second, it speaks volumes that more than 
20 years after the Assembly’s suggestion to lay down such a right explicit in the European 
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Convention on Human Rights,270 such an amendment has not taken place. Furthermore, a lot 
of international lawyers regard such a right as a mixed blessing. The members of the IBC’s 
working group on human gene therapy, for example, expressed their view that ‘to invoke a 
child’s right to an unaltered genetic makeup so as to visit upon him conditions incompatible 
with prolonged life is too paradoxical to be accepted.’271 In conclusion, the recognition of any 
of the above rights seems to be premature and does not reflect the current state of 
international human rights law. 
(3) The Prohibition of Germ-line Interventions for Non-Therapeutic Purposes – An Evolving 
Customary Rule
Turning away from the mere human rights perspective, I want to argue that there is a general 
international rule evolving that prohibits germ-line interventions for non-therapeutic purposes. 
The first example would be the absolute ban in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine of interventions aimed to introduce any modification in the genome of any 
descendants.272 Admittedly, with only 21 ratifications after almost eight years, the importance 
of this provision is questionable. It would also be difficult to argue that there is an 
international consensus on absolute prohibitions considering that during the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration on the Genome and Human Rights members of UNESCO rejected the 
German suggestion to amend such an absolute prohibition of germ-line interventions.273
Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that, unlike interventions to prevent severe hereditary 
diseases, non-therapeutic germ-line interventions are not permissible.274 This reasoning was 
predominant in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1982275 and is still 
upheld by UNESCO and WHO.276 As the verdict goes, ‘future individuals […] should be free 
to develop their potentialities without being biologically conditioned by the particular 
conceptions of “good” and “bad” human traits that were dominant at the time they were 
conceived.’277 Even liberal supporters of germ-line interventions admit that ‘knowing that 
something is an enhancement should […] raise a moral warning flag’ particularly because the 
question of ‘whether some enhancements constitute benefits will depend on the values 
                                                
270 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, ETS No 5 (entered into force 3 September 1950). 
271 Edgar and Tursz, above n 37, 17.
272 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, opened for signature 4 April 1997, ETS No 164, art 13 
(entered into force 1 December 1999).
273 Lenoir, above n 17, 555-6.
274 Edgar and Tursz, above n 37, 2.
275 Recommendation 934 (1982) on genetic engineering, above n 267, para 4(c).
276 Edgar and Tursz, above n 37, 17; WHO-Report, above n 43, 113
277 Galjaard, above n 35, para 97.
  
49
individuals hold, and parents’ values may not always coincide with those of their 
offspring.’278 Although parents have considerable influence on their children once they are 
conceived or born, children can express their own views which must be given due weight in 
accordance with their age and maturity and which can be legally enforced.279 Conversely, a 
child who does not want to be a basketball player but a jockey would meet difficulties to fulfil 
this dream if his or her parents had decided to have their offspring’s height increased to 2.20 
meters to provide him with the best chances for a career in basketball. While with a natural 
height of 2.20 meters children would have no one to blame, they might feel like the mere 
instrument of their parent’s wishes if they are genetically “enhanced” to that height. With 
regard to the unanimous condemnation of germ-line interventions for non-therapeutic 
purposes in the international community, the result of this analysis is that there is a rule of 
customary law evolving that unequivocally prohibits germ-line interventions that aim for the 
enhancement of offspring’s traits. In this case, human dignity might tip the scales for such a 
prohibition since one could certainly argue that enhancements will usually make the child a 
defenceless object of the parent’s plan for his or her future, no matter if they are well-intended 
or not. 
While the prevention of diseases and disabilities is less controversial, it also meets 
with criticism. Those who fear that therapeutic germ-line interventions will question the worth 
of disabled people and foster social discrimination on genetic grounds oppose even the 
prevention of diseases through genomics.280 Disabled or diseased persons would have to fear 
that the widespread prevention of disabilities fosters the discrimination against them. Thereby, 
genomics could unwittingly marginalize individuals with apparent hereditary disabilities who 
cannot afford to enhance their genome. From this point of view, we should not change 
individuals to fit society but change society to accommodate individuals. Questions of 
discrimination and the rights of the disabled also form a considerable part of Iulia-Antoanella 
Motoc’s report on human rights and bioethics to the UN Commission on Human Rights.281
The basis for the connection of therapeutic germ-line interventions and discrimination and 
rights of disabled is the principle of equality, which states that differential treatment due to 
special features of a person or group of people violates a fundamental principle of human 
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rights law.282 Since non-discrimination clauses usually relate to the rights laid down in the 
according codification and do not form a general prohibition of discrimination,283 UNESCO 
and the Council of Europe incorporated special provisions in their respective texts. They 
prohibit the discrimination on genetic grounds284 and require the confident handling of genetic 
data285 in order to nip genetic discrimination in the bud. 
In response to the above concerns, one can say that germ-line interventions do not 
question that disabled persons are as worth as persons without disabilities. Preventing a 
serious disease or disability is directed at the disadvantage and the suffering they can cause, 
not at existing persons with the disease or disability.286 The prevention of disabilities also 
creates great opportunities for the integration of people who would have been disabled, but 
benefited from germ-line interventions. This must and should not mean that the integration of 
the remaining disabled people comes to a halt. Legally, the principle of equality only requires 
equal treatment. In the context of the rights of disabled people, this involves that their lives 
are eased to give them equal opportunities. While they certainly can demand equal treatment, 
they cannot claim that this equality goes so far as to call for the existence of other disabled 
people.287 The principle of quality therefore does not entail a prohibition against germ-line 
interventions. However, it will certainly need to prove its worth when cases of genetic 
discrimination, particularly in labour and health insurance matters, occur. The mere danger of 
discrimination, however, does not suffice as a legal argument against therapeutic germ-line 
interventions. As long as all people are treated equally regardless of their genetic dispositions 
such a development does not violate human rights, even though genomics undoubtedly add a 
new ground on the list of reasons for discrimination that human rights law has to be aware of. 
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(4) Conclusion
The last pages have shown that in the context of germ-line interventions human dignity 
cannot be used as a ‘“conversation stopper” (J.F. Keenan) apparently settling an issue once 
and for all and tolerating no further discussion.’288 With the rights of future generations 
generally standing on shaky legs, it was time for a new provision to develop in international 
law. In my point of view, the common ground in international law is the prohibition of germ-
line interventions for non-therapeutic purposes, notwithstanding the difficulties to distinguish 
enhancements from treatments. This unambiguous statement would also limit the freedom of 
research and the rights to benefit thereof on the grounds of biological and social risks too high 
to allow enhancements, but not high enough to outweigh the benefits of therapeutic germ-line 
interventions. I admit that research in the direction of therapies will not be separable from 
research pursuing enhancements. However, the application will be, although borderline cases 
will always challenge our ethics. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Humans have long since possessed the tools 
for crafting a better world. Where love, 
compassion, altruism and justice have failed, 
genetic manipulation will not succeed.289
As often in discussion on genetics, there are a lot of questions to ask but only few definitive 
answers to give. In summary, this article comes to the following results. The analysis of 
present conventions and declarations dealing with genomics in the second chapter revealed 
that they form an incoherent picture. What they have in common is the general uneasiness 
connected with germ-line interventions. However, there is also the prospect of beneficial uses, 
which presumably prevented the Universal Declaration on the Genome and Human Rights 
from categorically banning all germ-line interventions. The examination of established human 
rights in chapter III showed that they deal with genomics rather superficially and cannot 
provide definitive answers. Procreative liberties, the rights of the child or the right to health 
have not yet developed enough to establish legal rights to a better living through germ-line 
interventions. In addition, the problem that the objects of protection of today’s human rights 
law are exclusively living or at least conceived individuals overshadows all attempts to argue 
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for such rights. However, the well-being of future generations is somewhat reflected in 
‘humanity’s right to knowledge [and] the considerable progress its results may bring in terms 
of the health and well-being of persons,’290 which forms the fundament of the freedom of 
scientific research and the individual’s right to enjoy the benefits thereof. Those rights could 
indeed support the research on and later application of germ-line interventions. As opposed to 
that, genomics are the object of fierce criticism. Some scholars compiled the opposing aspects 
in a proposal to a convention on the preservation of the human species.291 In this draft 
convention, the prohibition of intentional inheritable modification is based on human dignity, 
the threat of genetic discrimination, the creation of a subspecies and the danger of eugenic 
abuses. The Convention would not allow reservations to it and contain strict monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. However, as we have seen, human dignity is not as powerful a 
weapon against genomics as some might wish, neither is the mere danger of discrimination or 
references to the abuses of eugenics in the past. Current international law does not contain a 
conclusive rule against germ-line interventions, unless opponents let their predetermined 
opinion influence their interpretation of human dignity. However, the unanimous international 
opposition against the purpose of enhancing human traits could prove to be a customary rule 
of international law in the near future. While there is a noticeable temptation to accept the 
risks of germ-line interventions when it comes to severe hereditary diseases, the risk-benefit
ratio for mere enhancements is strongly regarded as being in disfavour of germ-line 
interventions. The more liberal approach to therapeutic germ-line interventions is based on 
parents’ wide discretion concerning the ways they raise their child and the legal right to speak 
on his or her behalf. Although they cannot claim to have an enforceable right to have their 
genome changed, they might be given the freedom to consent to the elimination of a defect 
gene, if this gene would stand in the way of almost any plan of life that their offspring is 
reasonably likely to choose. This attitude apparently mirrors the public opinion in the Western 
world. Surveys show that people tend to disapprove the idea of “designed babies” but feel 
more comfortable with genetic engineering against hereditary diseases.292 For example, a 
survey conducted by the Genetic and Public Policy Center among 1,200 adult Americans in 
October 2002 showed an approval of 59 per cent and disapproval of 34 per cent of 
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respondents asked for their opinion on germ-line interventions to prevent a genetic disease.293
As for the question of whether parents should change their own genes in order to have 
children who would be smarter, stronger, or better looking, 20 per cent approved whereas 76 
per cent disapproved.294 How a democratically legitimised parliament should deal with a 
public opinion that favours therapeutic germ-line interventions will certainly concern future 
politics. Will parliaments rather patronise their citizens for the sake of unaltered but 
sometimes diseased genomes? Will they allow for artificial tampering with the genome, 
thereby maybe jeopardizing humanity’s gene pool? The questions politicians will have to 
answer will be: Can future harms – discounted by the probability of their occurrence – really 
outweigh the benefits of germ-line interventions? On the other hand, can the future 
generations’ hypothesised interest in a disease free existence outweigh the risk for the 
destruction of the human species through its own hands? If gene therapy was regarded as 
permissible, the pivotal questions would be what is normal and abnormal, acceptable and 
unacceptable, viable and non-viable, and even more important: who should decide on those 
questions? Despite this paper’s rather liberal approach towards therapeutic germ-line 
interventions, we should not forget that sudden alterations of the human gene pool are risky, 
that even the outcome of beneficial interventions is unknown and that reckless tampering with 
genes could turn out to be disastrous for humanity. In the end, germ-line interventions should 
not be undertaken at all until scientists have sufficiently developed the technology to provide 
a clearly favourable risk-benefit ratio.295 Then again, the necessary experiments themselves 
will pose questions of human rights and human dignity. In addition, once genetic engineering 
has become a common procedure, people might be tempted to expand the scope of application 
more and more. Consequently, biological, psychological and social differences between 
individuals could be reduced to differences in their DNA and lead to genetic stratification that 
overestimates the significance of genetic material for a person’s abilities. Andrew Niccol’s 
Gattaca would have provided a look into our future. 
Human rights law cannot answer all those questions but it can determine taboos that 
must not be broken under any circumstances. According to the present analysis, this taboo is 
the enhancement of individuals through germ-line interventions, as it is laid down in the 
attached draft declaration. For the assessment of therapeutic interventions, intensive scientific 
research is necessary. However, progress should be made with caution. In this regard, I would 
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like to draw a parallel to the precautionary principle established in international 
environmental law. This principle is applied in the face of environmental hazards and requires 
preventive and abatement action where serious or irreversible harm is feared, even when 
uncertainty of whatever nature remains.296 I would therefore like to end this treatise with the 
same wise words Arie Trouwborst borrowed from ancient philosopher Confucius for the end 
of his book on the precautionary principle. The cautious seldom err.297
V. APPENDIX
Universal Draft Declaration on the Prohibition of Non-Therapeutic Germ-line 
Interventions 
The General Conference,
Recalling that the Preamble of UNESCO’s Constitution refers to ‘the democratic principles of 
the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men’, rejects any ‘doctrine of the inequality of men
and races’, stipulates ‘that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for 
justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of men and constitute a sacred 
duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern’, proclaims 
that ‘peace must be founded upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind’, and states 
that the Organization seeks to advance, ‘through the educational and scientific and cultural 
relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common 
welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its 
Charter proclaims’,298
Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of 16 December 1966, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20
November 1989, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992 and 
the Declaration of the Responsibilities of Present Generations towards Future Generations of 
27 November 1997,
Recalling its Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 11 
November 1997 and its Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 19 October 
2005,
Considering that interventions in the human germ-line may become a technical possibility,
Recognizing the human dignity and diversity of individuals, and emphasizing that human 
dignity denies living generations the right to predetermine the characteristics of future 
individuals and impose their conceptions of good and bad on them,
                                                
296 Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002) 286.
297 Confucius, The Quotations Page <http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/24046.html> at 21 October 2007.
298 This paragraph is taken from the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, above n 
14, preamble.
  
55
Solemnly recalling that therefore all kinds of germ-line interventions could be contrary to 
human dignity,
Having regard to the absolute prohibition of direct germ-line interventions in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine of 4 April 1997,
Considering the concerns that arise from uncertainty as to the health, safety and 
environmental implications of germ-line interventions, and from the longer-term legal, social 
and ethical issues raised by the prospect of knowing and interfering with a person's inheritable 
genetic pattern,299
Recognizing humanity’s enquiring mind and scientific curiosity as fundaments of the freedom 
of research, 
Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and 
future generations, and that germ-line interventions hold great promise for the treatment and 
eradication of certain diseases which are genetically transmitted,300
Bearing in mind the importance of procreative liberties and the human right to found a family, 
and particularly recognizing the human right to the highest attainable standard of health,
Emphasizing also the existing and potential contributions made by persons with disabilities to 
the overall well-being and diversity of their communities, and that the promotion of the full 
enjoyment by persons with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and of 
full participation by persons with disabilities will result in significant advances in the human, 
social and economic development of their societies,301
Emphasizing that research on germ-line interventions should fully respect human dignity, 
freedom and human rights, as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on 
genetic characteristics,302
Bearing in mind, and without prejudice to, the international instruments which could have a 
bearing on the applications of genetics in the field of intellectual property,303
Recalling 22 C/Resolution 13.1, 23 C/Resolution 13.1, 24 C/Resolution 13.1, 25 
C/Resolutions 5.2 and 7.3, 27 C/Resolution 5.15 and 28 C/Resolutions 0.12, 2.1 and 2.2, 
urging UNESCO to promote and develop ethical studies, and the actions arising out of them, 
on the consequences of scientific and technological progress in the fields of biology and 
genetics, within the framework of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,304
Adopts the present Declaration.
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A. Human dignity and the human genome305
Article 1
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as 
well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the 
heritage of humanity.
Article 2
(a) Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their 
genetic characteristics.
(b) That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic 
characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity.
Article 3
The human genome, which by its nature evolves, is subject to mutations. It contains 
potentialities that are expressed differently according to each individual’s natural and social 
environment, including the individual’s state of health, living conditions, nutrition and 
education.
Article 4
The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to financial gains.
B. Prohibition of non-therapeutic germ-line interventions 
Article 5
Germ-line interventions with non-therapeutic purposes, such as the enhancement of traits in 
the genome of any descendants, shall be prohibited. Subject to compatibility with human 
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, any intervention seeking to introduce any 
modification in the genome of any descendants may only be undertaken for preventive, 
diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. 
Article 6
(a) As for the distinction between non-therapeutic and therapeutic purposes of germ-line 
interventions all interventions shall be regarded as prima facie non-therapeutic. 
(b) Anticipating the probable progress in research on and safety of germ-line 
interventions, the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, States and relevant 
organizations, such as the World Health Organization, should contribute to the 
drawing up of a list of diseases whose seriousness could justify the interference with 
the germ-line. Progress in research and the safety of according procedures shall be 
given due regard in the risk-benefit assessment.
(c) The inclusion of a disease on the list shall be determined, inter alia, by the probability 
of the expression of the trait and the potential impact the gene in its natural state 
would have on potential offspring concerning survivability, the potential impairment 
of the range of opportunities in life, and the probable amount of pain and suffering for 
descendants.306
Article 7
Scientific and technological progress should not in any way impair or compromise the 
preservation of the human species.
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C. Implementation of the Declaration307
Article 8
States should make every effort to promote the prohibition laid down in this Declaration and 
should, by means of all appropriate measures, promote its implementation.
Article 9
The International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO should contribute to the further 
examination of issues raised by the future applications of germ-line interventions for 
preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. It should organize appropriate consultations 
with parties concerned, such as vulnerable groups. It should make recommendations, in 
accordance with UNESCO’s statutory procedures, addressed to the General Conference and 
give advice concerning the follow-up of this Declaration, in particular regarding the 
compatibility of  those interventions with human dignity.
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